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MARKET FAILURE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR LUNNEY 
WENDY J. GORDON* 
Professor Lunney's piece in this volume 1 is interesting enough that I forgive 
him for misportraying my own work. In this short reply I will clarify my 
position, and then examine both the place of my market failure argument and 
the place of some of Professor Lunney's arguments within the future of 
Intellectual Property scholarship as a whole. 
Professor Lunney describes a narrow interpretation of my market failure 
analysis.2 He is not alone. For some reason, it has become standard for 
economically-oriented commentators to state that the accepted interpretation of 
copyright's "fair use" doctrine is to see fair use as responding to high 
transaction costs between copyright owner and user. It has also has become 
standard to cite me for that limiting proposition,3 and to suggest, further, that 
my logic could lead to eliminating fair use where transaction costs between 
owner and user became low enough that negotiations can occur.4 
Yet the point of my original article was not to limit fair use. Admittedly, I 
suggested a strong limit to fair use in the third part of my test-the substantial 
• Professor of Law and Paul J. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston University School of Law. 
Copyright© 2002 by Wendy J. Gordon. 
1 Glynn S. Lunney, Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975 
(2002). 
2 He focuses primarily on my first article in the field, Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as 
Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its 
Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982) [hereinafter Fair Use as Market Failure]. 
3 An example (with an ameliorating footnote) is Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? 
Property Rights and Contract in the "Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130-34 (1997). Merges describes transaction-cost barriers 
between owners and users as having become "the prevailing view" of fair use, but notes that 
"[i]n all fairness, a re-reading of Gordon's article makes quite clear that this was only one of 
her chief insights." Id. at 130 n.52. 
4 See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights 
Management on Copyright's Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 584 n.129 (1998). 
For counter-arguments to Bell, see, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Redefining The Market Failure 
Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Permission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1 
(1997) (argument focused on market failure); Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: 
A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 {1996) 
(privacy argument). 
1031 
1032 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 82:1031 
injury hurdle.5 I now think I was wrong to posit such a broad and stringent 
component to my proposed test and have recently argued that a showing of 
substantial injury should bar fair use for only a subclass of cases.6 However, 
the substantial injury hurdle is not the issue before us now: We are looking at 
the market failure aspect of my analysis. As to that aspect, the goal was not to 
limit fair use, but quite the opposite. 
The article aimed to show that the Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit had 
been wrong to place all non-transformative uses-particularly, exact copying 
by consumers-outside the possibility of fair use.7 To show that the Ninth 
Circuit's view limiting fair use to "productive" or transformative uses was 
overly narrow, I sought to illuminate a more persuasive rationale. The logic I 
proposed was one that asked, "Is there some reason we cannot be confident 
that deferring to a copyright owner's self-interested decision will also serve 
social goals?" If such a reason appeared, then it might make sense for a judge 
to refuse to defer to a copyright owner's veto, and instead make an 
independent determination as to whether the defendant's use should go 
forward. The resulting logic of market failure was not only descriptive of case 
results, but sensible from a policy perspective as well. 
My methodology involved reviewing the role that market failure plays in 
ordinary law, 8 and then turning to a set of fact patterns well recognized as 
favoring fair use and showing that they corresponded to forms of market 
failure.9 Once the reader understood how market failure illuminated various 
legal doctrines, she could better understand why non-creative copying (of the 
kind done by teachers who make photocopies for class, students who copy 
passages while note-taking and consumers who make copies with their VCR's 
and computers) might also be eligible for fair use ifmarket failures appeared. 
As an example of how market failure illuminates an aspect of traditional fair 
use law, consider the preference the fair use doctrine shows for the educational 
user. From an economic perspective, the preference can be explained in part 
5 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market F ai!ure, supra note 2, at 1618-22. My suggested test 
had three parts: "Fair use should be awarded to the defendant in a copyright infringement 
action when (I) market failure is present; (2) transfer of the use to defendant is socially 
desirable; and (3) an award of fair use would not cause substantial injury to the incentives of 
the plaintiff copyright owner." Id. at 1614. 
6 Wendy J. Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodification 
and Market Perspectives, in THE COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, 
AND CULTURAL RAMIFICATIONS 149 at 183-84 (Neil Netanel & Niva Elkin-Koren eds.) 
(forthcoming 2002) [hereinafter Excuse and Justification]. 
7 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 970 (9th Cir. 1981), 
rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Although I agree with the Ninth Circuit that creative works 
deserve special solicitude under the fair use doctrine, the doctrine's shelter should not be 
restricted only to such works. 
8 See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1607-10 (discussing the work 
ofCalabresi, Coase, Demsetz, Markovitz, Polinsky, Posner, and others). 
9 Id. at 1627-35. 
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by the significant benefits the educator generates without receiving 
proportional reward: that is, the "positive externalities" he generates. A person 
who is able to generate significant external benefits in this way may be capable 
of producing a value-maximizing use of a copyrighted work, yet not have 
enough funds to let him purchase a license for engaging in the use. 10 A court 
interested in allowing the socially beneficial use to go forward may allow a 
liberty outside the market. The doctrinal name for the liberty is "fair use." 
Similarly, consider the preference within lhe fair use doctrine for defendants 
who wish to use the copyrighted work for purposes of communicating ideas or 
facts of high public import. Such a defendant's efforts are not only likely to 
generate positive externalities of a monetary kind, but the public import may 
also be of a type that is not calculable in monetary terms. I argued that 
"nonmonetizable interest" should be added to "positive externality" as a 
relevant form of market failure. 11 
As another example, consider hostile uses of copyrighted works, such as 
parodies or negative reviews. Such uses are likely to receive generous fair use 
treatment. They too generate a kind of market failure: an unwillingness to 
license at any cost. This is a form of market failure because such pricelessness 
is a sign of strong "endowment effects."12 In addition, our norms may require 
us to reject the legitimacy of the owner's desire to suppress, which involves 
rejecting the usual assumption of consumer sovereignty (that all desires are 
equal) upon which economic analyses are usually premised. 13 Thus, the 
IO See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1630. 
11 Id. at 1631-32. I strongly doubt that characterizing "nonmonetizable interest" as a 
form of market failure originated with me, but I would be glad to defend the 
characterization. 
12 For my discussions of "endowment effect" in the context of fair use, see Gordon, 
Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 169-77; Wendy J. Gordon, On the Economics of 
Copyright, Restitution, and "Fair Use": Systemic Versus Case-By-Case Responses to 
Market Failure, 8 J. L. & INFO. Sci. 7, 35-39 (1997); Wendy J. Gordon, Systemische und 
fallbezogene Losungsansiitze for Marktversagen bei lmmaterialgiitern [Systemic and Case-
by-Case Responses to Failures in Markets for Intangible Goods (Elisabeth Haberfellner 
trans.), in OKONOMISCHE ANALYSE DER RECHTLICHEN ORGANISATION VON INNOVATIONEN, 
BEITRAGE ZUM IV. TRAVEMUNDER SYMPOSIUM ZUR OKONOMISCHEN ANALYSE DES RECHTS, 
328, 360-66 (Claus Ott & Hans-Bernd Schiifer eds., Verlag Mohr & Siebeck, Tiibingen 
1994); Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and 
the Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1042 (1990) (book review). 
The logic of endowment effect is this: the hostile use causes harm to reputation and peace of 
mind. Reputation and peace of mind are "priceless" in the sense that they have high 
endowment effects. If an author had a right to refuse permissions, she might not sell 
licenses, even though, were the entitlement reversed, she might not be able to buy the user's 
silence. In cases of high endowment effect, therefore, the "highest-valued use" can change 
as entitlements change, and the market provides no stable guide to social value. 
13 For a discussion of "anti-dissemination motives," see Gordon, Fair Use as Market 
Failure, supra note 2, at 1632. The logic of anti-dissemination motives adds another 
possibility to the list of market inadequacies: that although the market is neutral as between 
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presence of high transaction costs between copyright owner and potential user 
is just another example of market failure. With this in mind, it seems ordinary 
rather than exceptional that the fair use statute explicitly includes a form of 
passive, consumer-type copying (making "multiple copies for classroom 
use" 14), and that fair use customs (such as note-taking) do the same. For fair 
use to embrace some forms of noncreative copying makes sense, provided 
some reason to distrust the market is present. 
Does my analysis suggest that if the Internet's promise of reducing 
transaction costs is realized, fair use will disappear? Hardly. Note that none of 
the other forms of market failure canvassed-such as positive externalities or 
endowment effects-will diminish in a context where copyright owner and 
user can bargain at low transaction cost. 15 Moreover, what I present here is 
hardly an exhaustive list even of technical market failures. 16 
I very much regret the way the market failure approach has grown-up, or 
rather grown-down, since the publication of my original piece. Transaction 
cost barriers are neither the only kind of economic problem to which fair use 
responds, nor the only kind of problem to which fair use should respond. 
Further, maximizing economic value "as measured by willingness to pay"17 is 
tastes (the taste for hats, the taste for suppression, the taste for discrimination), some tastes 
and motives should not be recognized as valid. To value some tastes over others violates 
"consumer sovereignty," but has quite respectable roots elsewhere. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, 
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 309 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d ed. 1967) (3d ed. 1698, corrected 
by Locke) (refusing to give weight to objections based on "covetousness"). 
14 17 u.s.c. § 107 (2000). 
15 This is a point well emphasized by Loren, supra note 4, at 26. 
16 For another possible example of market failure, consider the problem of strategic 
behavior in an anti-commons. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and 
Copyright Protection: A Price Theory Explanation, 221 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 458-59 
(2002). Yet another issue that makes a difference for assessing fair use in the digital context 
is privacy. To track a consumer's copying patterns for purposes of charging him money 
could reveal a great deal that the consumer would prefer to keep private. This problem 
could be characterized as a technical market failure (because, for example, the cost of 
technologically or contractually eliminating dangers to privacy could be seen as a 
transaction cost) or as a concern with alternative norms. As discussed further below, see 
infra text accompanying notes 34-37 and Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 
165-75, it may be useful to distinguish between reasons to distrust the market that stem from 
an inability to attain the technical conditions of perfect competition (because, for example, 
significant transaction costs are present) and reasons to distrust the market that stem from 
competing norms. 
17 This is the definition of "value" from Richard Posner's early work: value is "human 
satisfaction as measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services." 
RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW I 0 (2d ed. 1977), cited in Gordon, Fair Use 
as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1606. For an approach to economics less used by 
lawyers but more similar to that used by academic economists, see Louis Kaplow & Steven 
Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961 (2001). As Kaplow and Shavell 
point out, Judge Posner has himself amended his stance. See id. at 996 n.68. 
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not the only norm that matters or should matter for fair use. 
One factor contributing to the devolution of my market failure approach 
may have been literalism: since the term is "market failure," it can connote a 
complete failure of bargaining, perhaps calling up an image of owners and 
users who cannot meet because of transaction cost barriers. However, "market 
failure" has long been a term of art, employed not simply to denote actual 
failures of markets to appear, but also to embrace the many other ways in 
which real world market systems can fail to align private and social economic 
welfare. (Also, I may have muddied the waters by attempting to use the term 
even more broadly, to embrace ways in which real world markets can fail to 
achieve even non-economic social goals. If so, my forthcoming essay offers a 
solution-dividing the ways in which markets can fail into two types. 18) 
Despite my decision to use "market failure" terminology, I do not think the 
narrow view of fair use can be laid at my door. It is true that back in 1982, 
when Fair Use as Market Failure was published, I had greater hopes for 
intellectual property's use of both the efficiency norm and market institutions 
than I do today. Nevertheless, even in 1982, I was arguing that 
nonmonetizable interests should count as a species of market failure, 19 thus 
explicitly admitting that maximizing value, as measured by willingness to pay, 
did not exhaust the relevant norms. A few years later, I was arguing that 
endowment effects could make it meaningless to inquire into monetary 
valuations, particularly for items that are tied to priceless goods such as 
reputation.20 About that time, I was also arguing that claims of justice gave 
both authors21 and the public22 entitlements that were not fully dependent on 
economics. I have, before and since, further explored the links between 
consequentialist and non-consequentialist reasoning.23 Moreover, in articles 
18 I try to clarify the distinction between technical and normative market failure in 
Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 183-84, which is discussed further at 
infra text accompanying notes 34-37. 
19 Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1630-32. 
20 See supra note 12 (describing the endowment effect). This is connected to the issue of 
indivisibility: reputation and a license to quote one's work negatively may not be separable 
goods. 
21 Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in 
the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1540-55 (1993); Wendy J. 
Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent 
and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1435-60 (1989). 
22 Gordon, A Property Right in Self Expression, supra note 21, at 1535-40, 1555-72, 
1578-09; Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, supra note 21, ai 1460-65; see 
also Wendy J. Gordon, Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 93, 100 (1992). 
23 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Wendy J. Gordon, Arthur R. Miller & William F. Patry, 
The Constitutionality of Copyright Term Extension: How Long is Too Long?, 18 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 651, 674-86 (2000) (presentation by Gordon); Wendy J. Gordon, Norms of 
Communication and Commodification, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2321 (1996); Gordon, A Property 
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pursuing my continued interest in economics, I have expended a significant 
number of electrons questioning whether exclusion rights of the property form 
are really the best way to deal with prisoner's dilemma problems in 
intangibles, 24 and a large part of my concern has been similar to Professor 
Lunney's-the danger that the growth of propertarian models will cause us to 
lose the promise that could otherwise inhere in inexhaustibility.25 The promise 
is not only one of increased dissemination: I have argued that inexhaustibility 
can also help make practical the kind of affectional exchange and gratitude that 
enlivens creative community and promotes trust and law-abidingness,26 and (in 
some circumstances) can "promote Progress"27 as well as, or better than, 
monetary incentives. 28 
"Market failure" is a key concept because the system of tort, property, and 
contract that constitutes American law is predominantly a market system29 in 
which it is hoped that private self-interest will operate in a way consistent with 
the public's economic welfare.30 The importance of "market failure" as a 
concept is a virtual tautology: if our market system is usually supposed to 
reconcile private and public goals, and if sometimes our courts or legislatures 
create a privilege or limit a cause of action because the market system fails to 
do some part of its task, "market failure" is an appropriate and useful 
organizing device. 
It is true, as Professor Lunney emphasizes, that our market system evolved 
Right in Self-Expression, supra note 21, at 1608; Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and 
Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741 (1993); 
Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits, supra note 12, at I 026-46. 
24 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon & Robert Bone, Copyright, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & 
ECONOMICS 189 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000); Wendy J. Gordon, 
Authors, Publishers and Public Goods, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 174-76 (2002) 
(symposium on the Eldred case); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property As Price 
Discrimination: Implications For Contract, 73 CHl.-KENT L. REv. 1367, 1370-72 (1998). 
25 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 277-81 (1992). 
26 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 188-91 (also discussing choice 
of remedy); Gordon, Authors, Publishers and Public Goods, supra note 24, at 184-88. 
27 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
28 Gordon, Authors, Publishers and Public Goods, supra note 24, at 174-75, 184-88; 
Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES (Mark 
Tushnet & Peter Cane, eds.) (forthcoming 2003). 
29 Entitlements are given by the Jaw and traded by individuals. Prices serve as a signal to 
direct resources to their highest-valued uses. 
30 The notion that private self-interest in a perfect market will be consistent with the 
public's economic welfare is usually traced to Adam Smith and is referred to by use of his 
metaphor, "the invisible hand." ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES 
OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 477 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago Press 1976) (I 776) 
(contending that the self-interested market actor in a competitive economy is "led by an 
invisible hand to promote an end that which was no part of his intention"). 
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to take account of tangible and exhaustible goods. Yet, even for tangibles and 
land, where allowing use without compensation is likely to hurt the owner, our 
law limits the owner's causes of action and allows defenses in instances of 
market failure. 31 
Copyright and patent adopt this market system for application to intangible 
goods, again with the hope of serving both private and public welfare.32 
Because of inexhaustibility, someone using an intangible does not necessarily 
harm the owner. A fortiori, then, precisely as Professor Lunney says, when 
dealing with intangibles there are even more grounds for limiting an owner's 
cause of action or allowing defenses. My only puzzle is why Professor Lunney 
thinks I disagree. . 
To inquire into "market failure" is simply to ask, when can we as a society 
not safely rely on the bargain between owner and user to achieve social goals? 
To realize that we cannot always reach these goals by automatic deference to 
an owner is hardly to embrace economic efficiency as the only norm. To the 
contrary, it must be recognized that efficiency is just one way in which private 
and social goals can converge. As my more recent work makes explicit, when 
efficiency is unattainable, or other evidence exists that appropriate goals 
cannot be served by deferring to an owner, it may be appropriate for a court to 
refuse to enforce an otherwise relevant property right. 33 
As mentioned, in a recent article I suggest that it might be useful to divide 
market failures (and fair use) into two categories.34 In one category belong 
"technical failures" that prevent perfect competition from arising. These 
failures might result from the presence of, for example, endowment effects, 
high transaction costs between owner and user, transaction costs that prevent a 
user from internalizing the social benefit she generates, indivisible products, 
and strategic behavior. The category of technical market failure corresponds to 
the way many economists use the notion of "market failure." A second 
category addresses all the normative reasons why we might not want to rely on 
the market, such as dissatisfaction with the pursuit of economic value. 
I use the term "excuse" to denominate the category of technical market 
failure. The absence of permission and payment is excused because of special 
circumstances,35 but the goal remains the furtherance of economic welfare. By 
31 A classic work on this foundational point is Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. 
REV. 1089 (1972). 
32 Intellectual property law grants exclusive rights in the hope that the deadweight loss 
caused by the grant of exclusivity will be lower than the value of increased creative works 
drawn forth. 
33 See Gordon, Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 156. 
34 Id. 
35 A circumstance that triggers "excuse" can arise whenever reality fails to conform to 
the assumptions underlying the "invisible hand." See supra note 30. This failure can occur 
at a quite general level. For example, imagine we could identify a species of author or 
innovator who does not respond as homo economicus would, but who instead is indifferent 
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contrast, I use the tenn "justification" to denominate the category where the 
importance of non-economic norms makes us distrust the market. To find a 
use "justified" is to have concluded that, whether or not the technical 
conditions of perfect competition happen to be present, the user's failure to pay 
or failure to obtain pennission36 in the particular context is something that 
should be emulated. Both technical and nonnative market failures, excuse and 
justification, are instances in which we cannot trust the market system of 
ordinary property, tort, and contract to achieve desired goals. 
Professor Lunney says that many interpret the Sony case as implementing a 
transaction cost approach. If this interpretation is accurate, then under my new 
taxonomy the case would be an instance of technical market failure, or 
"excused" fair use. However, I agree with Professor Lunney that the writers of 
the Sony opinion did not frame their decision as determined by the transaction 
cost issue. 37 
Under conditions of either excuse or justification, absence of permission 
from an owner, and a lack of payment to him, 38 can be affirmatively desirable. 
Identifying these conditions-and applying the resulting insights both to the 
fair use doctrine and beyond it-is one of the major tasks facing Intellectual 
Property scholarship. Economics provides many important tools for 
identifying and analyzing IP contexts in which the market should be 
disfavored.39 So do sociology, psychology, literary theory and a number of 
other disciplines. 
Work on this crucial task is already well begun. Rebecca Eisenberg and 
to monetary incentives. That would give rise to an instance of "excuse": with such persons 
as market actors, we could not trust the market to achieve maximum welfare. Of course, 
were reality to diverge this sharply from the economist's ordinary assumptions, the market 
might no longer be the best institutional concept with which to begin analysis. See infra text 
accompanying note 46 (discussing the commons as an alternative starting place for 
analysis). 
36 Permission and payment are, of course, quite different issues. See e.g., Gordon, 
Excuse and Justification, supra note 6, at 158-72 (distinguishing among the desirability of 
the defendant's behavior, the desirability of the defendant's not having obtained consent, 
and the desirability of the defendant's not having paid compensation); id. at 188-91 
(discussing special problems presented by limiting copyright owners to a money-only 
remedy); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 2, at 1622-24 (discussing whether 
judicially-imposed compulsory licenses could provide an alternative to fair use). 
37 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
38 See supra note 36. 
39 It should be remembered that the market is only one of many institutional forms 
through which persons can seek maximize economic welfare. The firm is another such 
institution. R.H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988); R.H. Coase, The 
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). So, too, in appropriate contexts, is a 
commons. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and The Nature of the 
Firm, 112 YALE L.J. (forthcoming December 2002) (on file with author); sources cited infra 
note 45. 
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Arti Kaur Rai in the realm of basic science,40 Lewis Hyde in regard to the arts 
(particularly literature),41 Thomas Mandeville in the area of information 
economics, 42 and Y ochai Benkler in the field of institutional economics 
(particularly as applied to computer software),43 have each valuably pointed to 
areas and ways in which individuals and society can benefit less from a 
monetary market than they could from a flow of information and works 
unimpeded by toll booths. 
Professor Lunney's emphasis on the value of inexhaustibility contributes 
valuably to this new direction.44 We are learning continually more about the 
values and behaviors fostered by relationships of gift (Hyde), the conflicts 
between scientific norms and exclusivity (Eisenberg and Rai), the ways in 
which highly uncodified information is transmitted (Mandeville), the workings 
of "commons-based peer production" (Benkler), and the other ways and 
contexts in which a lack of exclusivity may be a delight rather than a tragedy.45 
Eventually we will develop a systematic set of tools for recognizing those 
areas in which the better starting place for analysis is not the market but a type 
of commons.46 Until then, it is useful to begin with the model of the market-
a model whose workings and virtues we know relatively well. In that 
endeavor, market failure remains the central organizing trope. We simply must 
be sure to include within it all the ways in which markets can let us down. 
40 Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the 
Norms of Science, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); Rebecca Eisenberg, Patents and the 
Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 
( 1989); Rebecca Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in Biotechnology 
Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177 (1987). 
41 LEWIS HYDE, THE GIFT: IMAGINATION AND THE EROTIC LIFE OF PROPERTY (1983). 
42 Thomas Mandeville, An Information Economics Perspective on Innovation, 25 INT'L J. 
Soc. ECON. 357 (1988), reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE INTERNATIONAL 
LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, SECOND SERIES 41 (Peter Drahos ed., 
1999). 
43 Benkler, supra note 39. 
44 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text. 
45 See, e.g., Peter Drahos, Introduction to INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THE INTERNATIONAL 
LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY, SECOND SERIES, at xiv-xix (Peter Drahos 
ed., 1999); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition 
from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998); Frank L. Michelman, Ethics, 
Economics and the Law of Property, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 3 (J. Roland 
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: 
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 711 (1986); David 
Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 147-48, 171-78 
(1981); see also Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990). 
46 For further discussion, see Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES (Mark Tushnet & Peter Cane eds.) (forthcoming 2003). 
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